Splitting Hairs: Why Courts Uphold Prison Grooming Policies and Why They Should Not by Schneider, Mara R.
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 
Volume 9
2004 
Splitting Hairs: Why Courts Uphold Prison Grooming Policies and 
Why They Should Not 
Mara R. Schneider 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Commons, and the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mara R. Schneider, Splitting Hairs: Why Courts Uphold Prison Grooming Policies and Why They Should 
Not, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 503 (2004). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol9/iss2/6 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
SPLITTING HAIRS:WHY COURTS UPHOLD PRISON
GROOMING POLICIES AND WHY'
THEY SHOULD NOT
Mara R. Schneider*
IN TR O D U C T IO N ........................................................................ 503
I. SUBSTANCE OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
PRISON GROOMING POLICIES ................................................. 504
A . Prison G rooming Policies ........................................... 506
B. Justifications for the Policies ......................................... 507
C. Are the Justifications Convincing or Merely Pretext? ........... 509
II. JUDICIARY AS THE WATCHDOG OF EQUAL PROTECTION ............. 513
A. Equal Protection of the Laws ....................................... 513
B. Evolution of the Equal Protection Doctrine ...................... 516
C. Mhat is the Purpose of Equal Protection? ........................ 523
III. JUDICIARY AS THE WATCHDOG OF FREE EXERCISE
OF R ELIGION ....................................................................... 528
A. Exemption from Generally Applicable Laws Based
on Free Exercise of Religion ........................................ 529
B. Evolution of the Free Exercise Doctrine ........................... 530
C. hat is the Purpose of Free Exercise? ............................ 533
IV ANALYZING PRISON GROOMING POLICIES UNDER AN
ANTI-O PPRESSION THEORY .................................................... 536
C O N C LU SIO N ............................................................................. 540
INTRODUCTION
Although prisoners retain the right to free exercise of religion, in-
carceration places some practical limits on this right. For prisoners
adhering to non-traditional religions, one of these practical limitations is
the inability to grow long hair or facial hair, due to prison grooming poli-
cies forbidding such growth. Minority prisoners have challenged these
grooming policies both as an impermissible infringement on religious
practice under the Free Exercise Clause and as a denial of a right based on
an impermissible racial or religious affiliation classification under the
Equal Protection Clause. Courts have generally been unsympathetic to
these claims, preferring instead to defer to determinations by prison ad-
ministrators that, for a variety of reasons, these grooming policies are
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necessary. This Note will explore how and why courts have upheld prison
grooming policies despite the burden they place on prisoners' freedom of
religious practice and will offer one justification, based on originalist ar-
guments, for courts to strike down these policies as inconsistent with the
Constitution.
A key component of this argument is determining the type of con-
duct the Framers intended to prohibit when they enacted the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The premise of this Note is that the
Framers intended both the Free Exercise and the Equal Protection
Clauses to prohibit oppressive, unequal treatment directed against indi-
viduals because of their membership in a minority group. From an
originalist perspective, therefore, courts should evaluate claims brought
under either of these clauses with an eye toward determining whether the
conduct at issue is oppressive, and whether it is being directed at the
plaintiff because of her membership in a minority group. Under this
mode of analysis, prison grooming policies should be struck down.
Part I describes the substance of prison grooming policies and pro-
vides a sampling of cases that have challenged these policies under the
Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses. Part It explores three theories
of discrimination that describe certain types of discriminatory conduct
that could be prohibited by the Equal Protection and Free Exercise
Clauses. These theories inform the definition of "equal protection of the
laws" and impact the analysis of equal protection challenges to prison
grooming policies. Part III explores the "religious exemptions" doctrine
and explains how courts have interpreted the protections offered to reli-
gious groups by the Free Exercise Clause. This Part also explores the ways
in which the development of the Free Exercise Clause has mirrored the
development of the Equal Protection Clause and argues that these similari-
ties justify a similar analysis of challenges to prison grooming policies
brought under either theory. Part IV analyzes prison grooming policies by
interpreting the constitutional provisions to prohibit oppressive discririna-
tory conduct directed at minority group members. Part V concludes this
Note by arguing that adoption of an anti-oppression theory of discrimina-
tion in the analysis of Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims requires
courts to strike down prison grooming policies.
I. SUBSTANCE OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR PRISON GROOMING POLICIES
Prisoners have launched challenges against grooming policies on
several constitutional grounds' and at least one non-constitutional
1. See, e.g., Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976) (alleging prison regu-
lation prohibiting beards violates free exercise of religion of Muslim prisoner); Rinehart v.
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ground.2 However, challenges are most frequently brought under the
Equal Protection Clause.' In response to these challenges, states have of-
fered many justifications, including: prisoner identification, 4 personal
hygiene,' maintenance of institutional security,6 and prevention of con-
cealment of contraband Courts have generally been reluctant to interfere
Brewer, 360 E Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (alleging that indefinite segregated confinement
of prisoners without a hearing because they refused to comply on religious grounds with
a hair-length regulation violated Fourteenth Amendment due process); United States ex
rel. Goings v.Aaron, 350 F Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972) (alleging in writ of habeas corpus that
prison hair-length regulation violates equal protection rights of American Indian inmate).
2. See, e.g.,Weaver v. Iago, 675 F2d 116 (6th Cir. 1982) (alleging hair length regula-
tion violated inmate's personal preference to express cultural heritage by growing long
hair). Congress may have provided prisoners with a new statutory weapon with which to
challenge prison grooming policies.The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act prohibits prisons, even with a rule of general applicability, from substantially burdening
the free exercise of a prisoner unless the rule is "in furtherance of a governmental interest;
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest." 42 U.S.C.A.
% 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2000). The constitutionality of the statute has not been addressed
by the Supreme Court. Lower courts are divided on whether or not § 2000cc-1 violates
the Constitution. See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Terhune, 314 F3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirm-
ing district court opinion holding that 5 2000cc-1 did not violate Establishment Clause
and was a valid exercise of Congress's spending power);Williams v. Bitner, 285 F Supp. 2d
593 (M.D.PA. 2003) (holding that § 2000cc-1 did not violate the Establishment Clause);
Hale 0. Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Com'n, 229 F Supp.2d 1056 (D. Hawaii 2002);
Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 E Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding 5 2000cc-i did not
violate establishment clause), rev'd, F3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003). For a discussion of the consti-
tutionality of the statute generally, see Shawn Jensvold, The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid Exercise of Congressional Power?, 16
B.YU.J. PuB. L. 189 (2001).
3. See generally Developments in the Law--In the Belly of the /hale: Religious Practice in
Prison, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1891, 1909-13 (2002); William Norman, Note, Native American
Inmates and Prison Grooming Regulations, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REa. 191 (1993); Timothy B.
Taylor, Note, Soul Rebels: The Rastafarians and the Free Exercise Clause, 72 GEo. UJ. 1605
(1984). Also, for an interesting discussion of the effect state equal rights amendments have
on the validity of prison grooming policies, see Marsha L. Levick & Francine T. Sherman,
hen Individual Differences Demand Equal Treatment: An Equal Rights Approach to the Special
Needs of Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, 18 WIS.WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Phillips v. Coughlin, 586 F Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that
prison directive that required every new inmate to receive one haircut and shave for pur-
pose of initial identification photograph is needed to carry out protective function of
prison system).
5. See, e.g.,Williams v. Batton, 342 F Supp. 1110 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (claiming groom-
ing policy requiring prisoners to keep their hair neatly cut is needed because long hair can
add to the problems of personal hygiene in any situation where many men are grouped
together in a confined space).
6. See, e.g., Poe v.Werner, 386 F Supp. 1014 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (holding prison hair-
length regulation is necessary to promote the preservation of internal prison order and
discipline, maintenance of institutional security, and rehabilitation of prisoners).
7. See, e.g., Dreibelbis v. Marks, 742 F2d 792 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding grooming
regulation is necessary to prevent concealment of contraband such as weapons and con-
trolled substances).
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with a warden's determination that policies are necessary in the unique
atmosphere of the prison environment, and have upheld the policies on
this basis, but they have also required that these policies not be unreasona-
bly or arbitrarily applied.8 This section will discuss in depth the substance
of prison grooming policies, the justifications states offer in support of the
policies, and the ways courts analyze these types of claims.
A. Prison Grooming Policies
Claims by prisoners that grooming policies interfere with their free
exercise of religion are brought only by state prisoners and federal prison-
ers housed in state prisons.The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) does not
impose a grooming policy restricting either hair or beard lengths in its
own institutions.' Inmates in federal facilities may choose a "hair style of
personal choice, and [the Bureau of Prisons] expects personal cleanliness
and dress in keeping with standards of good grooming and the security,
good order, and discipline of the institution.""0 An inmate "may wear a
mustache or beard or both."" However, for the sake of convenience, the
Bureau does contract with States to house federal prisoners in state insti-
tutions. Those federal inmates are subject to state prison grooming
policies, which are often much more restrictive than the federal policy. As
a result, federal prisoners with religious objections to cutting their hair
have challenged their placement in state institutions, arguing that the
BOP's convenience is not a sufficient justification for infringement of
their free exercise rights.
1 2
Prisoners in state facilities are subject to a wide variety of grooming
policies, and each state's policy has slightly different characteristics. 3 In
1999, the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) adopted a policy
requiring all inmates in VDOC facilities to wear their hair short, in
military-style fashion, and prohibited all inmates from wearing beards.
4
Similarly, Ohio prisoners are subject to a regulation that prohibits hair
8. See, e.g., Brooks v. Wainwright, 419 E2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970) (upholding the
validity of a prison regulation against constitutional attack by an inmate, partially because
there is no constitutional basis for interference with the vital state function of prison ad-
ministration unless a rule appears to be unreasonable or arbitrary).
9. See 28 C.ER. §§ 551.2,551.4 (1986).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Gartrell v.Ashcroft, 191 F Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002).
13. The policies discussed in this Part are not exhaustive of all types of prison
grooming regulations but are merely representative of the types of policies that exist in
state prisons. The specific regulations examined were chosen for purely practical reasons.
Either the regulations were accessible in their official form, or specific provisions were
mentioned in court opinions.
14. Va. Dep't of Corr. Div. of Operations Procedure No. 864 (1999).
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from protruding "more than three inches from the scalp,"'" and that
specifically prohibits dreadlocks.16 Additionally, facial hair must not
protrude more than one-half inch from the skin. 7 Arizona enacted a
grooming pohcy in 1988 that permits mustaches, sideburns, and shoulder-
length hair but prohibits full or partial beards, unless the prisoner cannot
shave for medical reasons."8 Finally, New York permits inmates to wear
beards as long as they do not exceed one inch in length.'9
B.Justifications for the Policies
As mentioned above, when prisoners have challenged their prisons'
grooming policies, states have offered many different reasons for their en-
actment. For example, Arizona defended its policy on the theory that it
aided "rapid and accurate identification because looking at facial charac-
teristics on a clean shaven face constitutes a quick and accurate way to
identify prisoners. ' '2' Beards, the Arizona Department of Corrections
(ADOC) reasons, frustrate the use of facial characteristics to identify pris-
oners because they can easily be used either to hide or change facial
characteristics.2 New York justified its policy partially on the theory that
untrimmed beards present not only security problems but also "safety and
hygiene hazards when worn by inmates assigned to food service or the
operation of machinery."22 An Ohio prison warden claimed that his
prison's grooming policy was necessary because "long hair and thick, full
beards and sideburns provide good hiding places for such contraband as
drugs and weapons. '23 The regulation, the warden contended:
[f]urthers the compelling interest in maintaining security in
Ohio's prisons by reducing the danger of injury to staff mem-
bers and the tension that would otherwise follow from the
increased close and/or physical contact resulting from the
more frequent and more invasive searches that would be nec-
essary to deal with contraband in inmates' hair.
2 4
15. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-25(D) (2002).
16. Id.
17. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-25(F) (2002).
18. Ariz. Dep't of Corr. Internal Mgmt. Policy No. 304.7 (1988), superseded Ariz.
Dep't of Corr. Dep't. Order 704.01-704.02 (1996).
19. Dep't of Corr. Serv. of N.Y. Directive No. 4914 (1976).
20. Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990).
21. Id.
22. Fromer v. Scully, 874 E2d 69,71 (2d Cir. 1989).
23. See Flagner v.Wilkinson, 241 F 3d 475,484-85 (6th Cir. 2001).
24. Id. at 485.
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Prison officials also contend that alternative regulations for those
with religious objections to the grooming policy would "breed resent-
ment among inmates as well as confrontations between inmates and
guards."2 The final reason typically offered in support of these policies is
the controlling of prison gang activity. South Carolina, for example, main-
tains that its grooming policy is necessary because prison gangs try to
intimidate correctional officers and victimize other inmates, and "officials
were aware that prison gangs used hairstyle to maintain group identity."26
Of course, the problem with accepting any of these reasons as a jus-
tification for a grooming policy is that, while some prisoners may use the
length of their head or facial hair for illicit purposes, other prisoners may
use hairstyle to maintain religious identity.27 Several religions require their
male members to forgo cutting their hair as a tenet of the religion. The
Code of Jewish Law provides, "[t]he Torah has forbidden to shave the
"corners" of the beard with a razor only.'28 Sunni and other Muslim sects
prohibit male followers from shaving their faces. 29 Likewise, a fundamental
tenet of Rastafarianism prohibits a male from shaving his beard or cutting
his hair after he has taken theVow of the Nazarite.3 °
Finally, it is interesting that each of these states has offered a different
rationale for its policy, even though their policies are similar. There are
several possible reasons for these different rationales. First, each state may
be using the policy to respond to a unique situation within its prisons.
Second, the states may have paid attention to the results of litigation sur-
rounding other prison grooming policies and then developed rationales to
survive scrutiny by the courts. Finally, the states' purpose for developing
these policies actually may be to enforce a degree of conformity among
prisoners. In other words, the rationales offered by the states may be pre-
texts designed to avert the courts' attention away from the true purpose of
the policies: to repress individuality and to use the state's coercive power
to prevent the practice of unpopular religions within their prisons.31
25. Fromer, 874 E2d at 71.
26. Hines v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., 148 E3d 353,356 (4th Cir. 1998).
27. In addition to presenting concerns about prisoners' constitutional rights, prison
grooming policies may undermine at least one of the stated goals of our criminal justice
system-rehabilitation. Requiring prisoners who adhere to these religions to cut their hair
or beards forces them to abandon sincerely-held beliefs and could undermine the inmates'
prospects of rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. On the important role of
religion in the rehabilitation of prisoners, see Batson, Sociobiology and the Role of Religion in
Promoting Prosocial Behavior:An Alternative View, 45 J. OF PERSONALITY & SocIAL PSYCH 1380
(1983).
28. KABBI SOLOMON GANZFRIED, THE CODE OF JEwiSH LAW, vol. IV, 54 (Hyman E.
Goldin, LL.B., trans., Hebrew Publ'g Co. 1963).
29. Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 E Supp. 2d 48, 65 (D.D.C. 2000).
30. Id.
31. Unlike prisoners, employees have challenged the use of workplace grooming
policies as pretexts for discriminatory treatment. See, e.g., Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F3d
[VoL. 9:503
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C. Are the Justifications Convincing or Merely Pretext?
Circuit courts are split on the issue of whether these proffered pe-
nological interests are sufficient to justify an infringement on a prisoner's
constitutional right to freedom of religious exercise. 2 In Gartrell v.
Ashcroft,3 3 the District of Columbia District Court ordered Rastafarian
and Muslim federal prisoners who had religious objections to Virginia's
grooming policy moved from the VDOC facilities in which they were
held to facilities without similarly burdensome grooming policies.14 Had
these inmates been held in a federal facility, they would not have been
subject to a grooming policy that required them to shave their beards and
dreadlocks. Because the Bureau of Prisons had not established that its
convenience was a sufficient justification for subjecting these prisoners to
the more restrictive grooming policy in the VDOC facilities, the court
held that the prisoners' interest in their constitutional right to free exer-
cise of religion was more compelling.
In Flagner v. Wilkinson3 1 the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that al-
though substantial deference was due prison officials in the adoption of
policies that, in their judgment, are needed to preserve internal order, dis-
cipline, and institutional security, that deference disappears if there is
evidence that the officials have exaggerated their response.36 The court
reasoned that Ohio prison officials had failed to establish that the more
"thorough searches" that would be required when an inmate has a beard
would result in anything more than minimal, if any, physical contact with
the inmate, since the inmate could simply be required to run his own
652, 661 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff presented evidence, sufficient to avoid a
summary judgment motion, that her employer was using its grooming policy as a pretext
for discriminatory firing).
32. Compare Green v. Polunsky, 229 E3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2000) (denying exemp-
tion to Texas prison grooming policy for Muslim inmates), Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d
810, 816 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of exemption from Missouri prison grooming
policy to Native American inmate), and Phipps v. Parker, 879 F Supp. 734, 736 (W.D. Ky.
1995) (rejecting claim for exemption from Kentucky prison grooming policy to Hasidic
Jewish inmate), with Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F2d 1521, 1527 (10th Cir. 1991) (remanding
case determination of whether Native American inmate's sincerely held religious belies
entitled him to an exemption from Oklahoma prison grooming policy), Benjamin v.
Coughlin, 905 F2d 571, 577 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring an exemption from New York
prison grooming policy for Rastafarian inmates), Estep v. Dent, 914 F Supp. 1462, 1466-
68 (WD. Ky. 1996) (granting injunction to prevent Kentucky prison from cutting the
earlocks of an Orthodox Jew), and Luckett v. Lewis, 883 E Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. 1995) (re-
quiring an exemption from Arizona prison grooming policy for inmate who belonged to
the Freedom Church of Revelation).
33. 191 F Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002).
34. Id. at 41.
35. 241 E3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071 (2001).
36. Id. at 483.
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fingers through his beard and sidelocks. 31 Thus, the court permitted the
plaintiff to seek an injunction against the prison administration to prevent
the administration from forcing a Hasidic Jewish prisoner to cut his beard
and sidelocks.
3 8
In contrast, the Second Circuit refused to permit a Hasidic Jew to
grow his hair and beard and determined that doing so would be contrary
to a legitimate interest in maintaining security in its prisons. 9 The court
reasoned that despite the plaintiff's sincerely-held beliefs and the possibil-
ity that he would be required to break a tenet of his religion, the plaintiff
"simply h[ad] not met [his] heavy burden of showing that [prison]
officials have exaggerated their response to ... genuine security considera-
tions." '4 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit refused to exempt Native American,
Rastafarian, and Muslim inmates from the effects of a prison grooming
policy, stating that the South Carolina Department of Corrections was
addressing "actual dangerous situations" that had arisen in South Carolina
prisons.41 With a somewhat different justification, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that a Texas grooming policy did not violate free exercise rights of
Muslim inmates because the policy served the legitimate penological in-
terest of preventing prisoners from completely altering their appearance,
and because it did not deprive inmates of all means of expressing their
religious beliefs.42
The Supreme Court has specifically held that prisoners retain the
right of free exercise of religion while incarcerated.43 However, the free-
dom to act is not absolute. Even for non-incarcerated citizens, the Court
has limited religious practices for a variety of reasons. 4  The state may
regulate religious practices as long as the regulation does not unduly in-
fringe upon a religious belief or opinion." This right to regulate religious
practice is expanded in a prison, because the state has an interest in main-
taining institutional security.46
Given the state's interest in maintaining institutional security, the
Supreme Court has developed two general principles that guide its deci-
sions when faced with prisoners' challenges to restrictive policies: first,
"convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason
of their conviction and confinement in prison;"" and second, "lawful in-
37. Id. at 486.
38. Id. at 488.
39. Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cit. 1989).
40. Id. at 76 (quoting Bell v.Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561-62 (1979).
41. Hines v. South Carohna Dep't of Corr., 148 E3d 353,356 (4th Cir. 1998).
42. Green v. Polunsky, 229 F3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2000).
43. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
44. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
45. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,304 (1940).
46. See Price v.Johnston, 334 U.S. 266,285 (1948).
47. Bell v.Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,545 (1979).
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carceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underly-
ing our penal system. ' 4 The Court has justified these limitations on
prisoners' exercise of constitutional rights based on valid penological ob-
jectives, "including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and
institutional security."49 In other words, "when a prison regulation im-
pinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."5 Further, to ensure
that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, the Court has
determined that "prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional
rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that or-
dinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional
rights." 1 The Court has decided, even where claims are made under the
First Amendment, not to substitute its judgment on "difficult and sensitive
matters of institutional administration"52 "for the determination of those
charged with the formidable task of running a prison."5 3
However, the federal government believes that there should be limits
imposed on prison officials' discretion. 4 At least with respect to schedul-
ing religious observances, the BOP Directive implementing the
regulations on Religious Belief and Practices of Committed Offenders
states, "the more central the religious activity is to the tenets of the in-
mate's religious faith, the greater the presumption is for relieving the
inmate from the institutional program or assignment."5
In Abdul Wali v. Coughlin,-6 the Second Circuit offers a balanced ap-
proach that courts could use to set limits on prison officials' discretion to
infringe on religious practices. This approach adopts a burden-shifting
mechanism, similar to a disparate impact analysis, which would make it
easier for prisoners to succeed in their free exercise claims. The court sug-
gested that the degree of scrutiny applied to prison regulations should
depend on "the nature of the right being asserted by prisoners, the type of
activity in which they seek to engage, and whether the challenged restric-
tion works a total deprivation (as opposed to a mere limitation) on the
exercise of that right."5 7 The Second Circuit suggests that where exercise
of the asserted right is not presumptively dangerous, and where the prison
has completely deprived an inmate of that right, then prison officials must
48. Price, 334 U.S. at 285.
49. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,348 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
50. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
51. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
52. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,588 (1984).
53. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353.
54. Seegenerally 28 C.FR. % 548-551 (1986).
55. 28 C.ER. § 548.10-584.15 (1986).
56. 754 F2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985).
57. Id. at 1033.
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show that "a particular restriction is necessary to further an important
governmental interest, and that the limitations on freedoms occasioned by
the restrictions are no greater than necessary to effectuate the govern-
mental interest involved."" '8 As the Supreme Court noted in Turner v.
Safley,s9 the "existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that
the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response' to prison
co n cern s.
'60
Growing head or facial hair, as noted above, may often be a funda-
mental tenet of the prisoner's religion, and many institutions, through
their grooming policies, completely deprive prisoners of the right to par-
ticipate in that aspect of their religions. Unless the activity is
presumptively dangerous, however, the state ought to be required to show
that the restriction is necessary to serve some important state interest, and
that no less-restrictive alternative was adequate to accomplish that interest.
To establish that the prisoner wants to grow his hair or beard in order to
participate in his chosen religion, and not for some other purpose, the
state may be required to evaluate whether the inmate has a bona fide reli-
gious belief. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has developed policies that are
designed to achieve this end.61 For example, inmates who seek to partici-
pate in religious-based dietary practices are required to make the request
in writing and be subjected to an interview by the prison chaplain.12 The
prison makes its decision on whether to allow the prisoner to participate
in the religious-based food service program based on this interview.
In a well-reasoned dissent in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,63 Justice
Brennan argued that it was a challenge for the Court to determine how
best to protect the rights that prisoners retain while incarcerated. He argued
that "[i]ncarceration by its nature denies a prisoner participation in the lar-
ger human community" and that "[t]o deny the opportunity to affirm
membership in a spiritual community ... may extinguish an inmate's last
source of hope for dignity and redemption "'6 It would be particularly
harmful for the Court to deny participation in a religious activity based on
regulations that are motivated by some illegitimate purpose. As mentioned
above, it is at least plausible that states have promulgated their grooming
policies to impose conformity within the prison population.
In light of this observation, courts actually may be supporting the
states' use of their coercive powers to impose conformity under the guise
of institutional security. The prisoners' challenges to these regulations pre-
58. Id.
59. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
60. Id. at 90.
61. Gartrell v. Ashcroft, 191 F Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.D.C. 2002).
62. See, e.g., 28 C.ER. § 548.20(b) (1986) (requiring the chaplain to give approval
for participation in or withdrawal from religious dietary accommodations).
63. 482 U.S. 342,354 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 368.
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sent courts with an opportunity to closely examine the justifications for
prison grooing policies and to determine whether they are consistent
with the Constitution. The following two Parts explore how understand-
ing the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses from an originalist
perspective may provide the courts with a tool to invalidate these prison
regulations.
II.JuDICIARY AS THE WATCHDOG OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Many of the challenges to prison grooming polices are based on the
claim that the regulations violate prisoners' Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights.6" In order to assess whether these claims are valid, it is
important to determine what types of discriminatory conduct the Equal
Protection Clause was meant to prohibit. The types of conduct that are
prohibited by this clause will vary significantly depending on whether an
anti-differentiation, anti-oppression, or anti-subordination theory of dis-
crimination is chosen.66 This Part explores the meaning of equal
protection based on each of these theories, tracks the courts' use of each
of these theories, and concludes that equal protection claims should be
analyzed under an anti-oppression theory of discrimination because this
theory is most consistent with the original understanding of "equal pro-
tection of the laws."
67
A. Equal Protection of the Laws
The first eight amendments to the Constitution guarantee that indi-
viduals will be free from the interference of the federal government in
certain aspects of their lives. For example, the Establishment Clause" pro-
hibits the federal government from creating a national religion, and the
Takings Clause69 prohibits it from taking private property for public use
without just compensation. From the time the Constitution was ratified
until the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed, there was little indication
that the Framers meant for the limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights
to be enforced against the states.7 0 After the abolition of slavery, however,
65. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (defining the anti-differentiation,
anti-oppression, and anti-subordination theories of discrimination).
67. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. U.S. CONST. amend.V.
70. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment was "intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the govern-
ment of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states"); see also
JOHN HART ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DISTRUST 196 n.58 (1980) ("In terms of the original
understanding, Barton was almost certainly decided correctly.").
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the mood among the country's leaders changed. The passage of the Black
Codes made it that the southern states had no intention of extending any
rights to the newly freed Black slaves. In effect, these laws reduced the
freedmen to their previous states. Congress responded to these Codes by
enacting the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Among other things, this
Amendment sought to force the states to guarantee that Black citizens
could enjoy the same "privileges and immunities" that White citizens en-
Y.72joy.
n
In addition to the protection of privileges and immunities, the
Amendment guarantees no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, and
property, without due process of law."7' 3 This limitation has been inter-
preted to be essentially the same as that placed on the federal government
by the Fifth Amendment. 74 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
ends with the Equal Protection Clause, a peculiarly worded clause that has
been the subject of a great deal of scholarly debate. The Equal Protection
Clause guarantees the state shall not deny any "person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."'7  However, the Court's
interpretation of just what is meant by "equal protection of the laws" has
changed markedly over the years. 6 As a general proposition, this Clause
was designed to prohibit morally objectionable discrimination.
77
The difficulty that courts face is determining what behavior consti-
tutes "morally objectionable discrimination." Hasnas has proposed three
"candidates" for the type of discrimination the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to eliminate: "1) unequal treatment on the basis of irrelevant
71. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth
Amendment, 36 AKRON L. Rxv. 671, 685 (2003) (asserting that the "reaction [to the Black
Codes] led to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1866 and later to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment").
72. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), for example, the Court stated that
"[the Fourteenth Amendment] nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State ac-
tion of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of the United States, ...
[and provides] modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State
officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified
in the amendment." Id. at 11-12.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
74. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (recognizing
that the "reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive
with that of the Fourteenth"); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326 (1932) ("The restraint
upon legislation by the due process clauses of the two amendments is the same.").
75. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
76. See generally John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-
Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71
Foa m4 L. REiv. 423, 441-88 (2002) (tracking the development of equal protection juris-
prudence from Plessy to Griggs).
77. Id. at 428-31 (arguing that a "moral principle" places restrictions on the means
used to achieve an end, and that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits using discrimina-
tory means to pursue legitimate state interests).
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characteristics; 2) oppressive unequal treatment directed against individuals
because of their membership in a minority group; and 3) conduct that has
the effect of subordinating or continuing the subordination of a minority
group." 8 The types of conduct that are prohibited by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause will vary significantly depending on the definition of
discrimination that is chosen. The consequences of each definition will be
discussed briefly below.
The anti-differentiation principle describes discrimination as "un-
equal treatment on the basis of irrelevant characteristics."7 Whether a
characteristic is irrelevant depends on the context in which the classifica-
tion occurs. For example, in the education context, a characteristic is
irrelevant if it does not affect a person's ability to learn or to meet the
academic requirements of an institution. 0 Generally, under the anti-
differentiation principle, any classification based on race, gender, religion,
or sexual orientation is morally wrong per se, because these characteristics
are unrelated to the tasks an individual is called on to perform."'
The anti-oppression principle describes discrimination as
"oppressive unequal treatment directed against individuals because of
their membership in a minority group."8 2 As the definition suggests, it is
the motivation behind the behavior that is important in determining
whether the discriminatory conduct is morally objectionable. For
example, if a classification is made for the purpose of degrading
minorities, or to reduce them to second-class political or social status, it is
morally objectionable. 3 Classifications made for that purpose would be
impermissible under this theory.
The anti-subordination principle describes discrimination as "any
conduct that has the effect of subordinating or continuing the
subordination of a minority group."84 This principle prohibits any conduct
that undermines the political or social status of minorities. Under this
principle, the motivation for the conduct is unimportant; only the
consequences matter. Therefore, even if conduct that is not designed to
discriminate against minorities has the unintended consequence of
increasing or continuing their socially disadvantaged position, it is




81. Id. at 431-34. Hasnas uses the term "morally objectionable" to imply that dis-
crimination between groups is immoral if is based on an immutable characteristic, such as
race, gender, or sexual orientation, that is unrelated to performance or merit, or if the
distinction is made for the purpose of oppressing a group. Id.
82. Id. at 434.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 437.
85. Id.
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At various times throughout its history, the Supreme Court has
adopted each of these principles.The evolution of the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause, and the manner in which the Court's
understanding of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 informs its interpretation
of that Clause, is described in the next section.
B. Evolution of the Equal Protection Doctrine
In 1857, Chief Justice Roger Taney wrote the opinion for the
Supreme Court in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.86 In that famous
opinion, Taney posited that at the time of the founding of the United
States, the "[N]egro African race" had been "regarded as beings ... so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the [W]hite man was bound to
respect. The belief that Blacks are inherently and biologically inferior to
Whites has been abandoned, at least in the eyes of the Court, although the
Court has largely permitted this belief to persist in private associations.88
Because this case was decided eight years before the abolition of
slavery and ten years before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court had no occasion to consider whether Scott had been the
victim of any of the forms of "morally objectionable discrimination" de-
scribed above. Slaves were viewed as property and were not entitled to the
"equal protection" of any law. It is easy to see, however, that under any of
the three principles described above, the enslavement of a Black man by a
White man would be considered impermissible discriminatory conduct
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Forty years after Dred Scott, the Supreme Court decided another
landmark case that marked a significant shift in the Court's conception of
86. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
87. Id. at 407.
88. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN,'. L. REv. 1,
8-10 (1991) (discussing the Court's protection of racial discrimination in which one party
presses the freedom to contract or freedom of association).
89. See Richard A. Wasserstrom, A Defense of Programs of Preferential Treatment, in So-
cxAL ETHiCs: MORALITY AN SocILM POtICY 213, 215 (Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S.
Zembaty eds., 3d ed. 1987). In the context of slavery,Wasserstrom notes:
The primary thing that was wrong with the institution [of slavery] was not
that the particular individuals who were assigned the place of slaves were as-
signed them arbitrarily because the assignment was made in virtue of an
irrelevant characteristic, their race. Rather, ... the primary thing that was and
is wrong with slavery is the practice itself ... The practices were unjustifi-
able-they were oppressive-and they would have been so no matter how
the assignment of victims had been made.
Id. Choosing victims based on race violates the anti-differentiation principle, and the oppres-




race. In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute that re-
quired separate seating for Blacks and Whites in public carriers. The
decision reached by the Court in Plessy would have been the same had it
adhered to the anti-oppression or anti-subordination theory of discrimi-
nation. The anti-oppression theory does not require equality of
opportunity, which means that Blacks would not be entitled to entrance
into a railway car designated forWhites only because that practice would be
oppressive in effect. This theory merely requires that conduct or statutes
cannot be intentionally discriminatory to minorities. In other words, the
legislature that enacted the statute could not have been motivated by a de-
sire to reduce Blacks to a second-class status. The plaintiff in Plessy may very
well have lost under this theory, because the Court found that enforced
separation of the races was not intended to "stamp ... the colored race with
a badge of inferiority."91 However, if the Court had found that forced sepa-
ration was intended to designate Blacks as inferior, under the anti-
oppression theory of discrimination, the statute would violate equal protec-
tion.
The anti-subordination theory would also not automatically require
that the plaintiff in Plessy have equal access to the White railway car. This
theory permits unequal access if the purpose or effect of the restriction is
not subordinating. In the Court's opinion, Blacks were not subordinated
by enforced separation of the races.9 2 As a result, the statute did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause under an anti-subordination theory. In con-
trast to the analysis using the anti-subordination and anti-oppression
theory, under the anti-differentiation principle, the Louisiana statute
clearly would not stand. Under that theory, equal access would be a re-
quirement, because any classification based on race is discriminatory per
se.
Nearly sixty years after Plessy, the Court began a transition away
from the idea of discrimination as an anti-oppression or anti-
subordination principle and toward the idea of discrimination as an anti-
differentiation principle. In large part, this shift was a result of the Court's
realization that the only way in which it could truly prevent oppressive
state action was to prohibit states from drawing any racial distinctions at
all.93 In Brown v. Board of Education,94 the Court recognized that separation
by race was inherently subordinating and had the effect of perpetuating
the discriminatory status quo, and in turn the Court rejected the
90. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
91. Id. at 551.
92. Id. (stating that the "underlying fallacy of [Plessy's] argument [is] the assumption
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of infe-
riority.")
93. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 466.
94. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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prevailing view that racial segregation was unconnected to oppression.95
Justice Thurgood Marshall also recognized this fact approximately twenty
years later in his Bakke v. Regents of the University of California96 dissent.
Marshall stated:
It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual
Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial dis-
crimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive
that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to es-
cape its impact. The experience of Negroes in America has
been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other
ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but
also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law.
And that mark has endured.
97
The Court in Brown recognized this inherent nature of school seg-
regation and determined that "in the field of public education, 'separate
but equal' has no place."" The Court did not explicitly announce in
Brown that it had adopted an anti-differentiation theory in the equal pro-
tection context, but it did several years later in Goss v. Board of Education.99
In that case, the Court declared that "[c]lassifications based on race for
purposes of transfers between public schools ... violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [because] racial classifications
are 'obviously irrelevant and invidious.'00
Despite the anti-differentiation mandate inherent in Brown, language
in that case likely would have come out the same way had the Court
adopted an anti-subordination theory of discrimination. Analyzing the
facts of Brown under an anti-subordination principle, Blacks would be
granted access to the same schools as Whites only if the failure to grant
access perpetuated a racial hierarchy. It was clear at the time that Brown
was decided, however, that the statutes prohibiting integration were de-
signed to and did maintain the second-class social status of Blacks.'
95. Id. at 494 (finding that a "policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the [N]egro group").
96. 438 U.S. 265 (1977).
97. Id. at 400 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
98. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
99. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
100. Id. at 687 (quoting Steele v. Louisiana & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203
(1944)).
101. See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 76, at 453 n.92 (arguing that, despite the Court's
apparent approval of the statute at issue in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), which
increased the penalties for adultery and fornication when the participants were of different
races, "the statute in question was surely designed to oppress African Americans. By
punishing more harshly intercourse between the races, it was designed to discourage such
intercourse, and was part of a larger scheme of legislation intended to isolate and
marginalize the African American minority.").
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Similarly, under the anti-oppression theory of discrimination, Blacks
would be permitted access to the same schools as Whites only if the stat-
utes prohibiting their access were motivated by a desire to brand Blacks as
inferior. It is difficult to know exactly how the Court would have applied
this theory to the facts of Brown, but given both the history of race rela-
tions in the country and the social climate in which this case developed,
the Court likely would have found that the Jim Crow statutes were moti-
vated by a desire to maintain Blacks' second-class status. 11 2 As a result, the
Court would likely have reached the same decision had they adhered to
an anti-oppression theory of discrimination.
Ten years after Brown, the Court was required to decide the consti-
tutionality of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 and the Court
interpreted that statute in a way that suggested Congress had adopted the
anti-subordination theory of discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
the Court reasoned that Title VII was designed in part to create equality
in employment opportunities and also to remove the barriers that had
operated in the past to favor White employees over other employees."°
The success of this statute was dependent on the willingness of minority
employees to bring suits to enforce its provisions. Congress recognized
that employers would easily be able to escape the effects of Title VII by
utilizing facially neutral policies that had the effect of maintaining the
discriminatory status quo if it required employees to prove intentional
discrimination. To prevent such outcomes, Congress amended Title VII
with a provision to provide a method of proving discrimination by dispa-
rate impact."° It is the responsibility of the courts to determine when a
plaintiff successfully proves discrimination by this method.
The Court decided Griggs in a time when the decades-long segrega-
tion of public schools and oppressive Jim Crow legislation left Blacks with
"less educational attainment, fewer job skills, and less experience" than
Whites.10 6 Improvements in the economic condition of Blacks, therefore,
were unlikely to be accomplished by adhering to an anti-differentiation
principle of discrimination, which would have required all educational
and employment decisions to be made on a purely meritorious basis. 7
102. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (characterizing a statute
that barred Blacks from serving on juries as "unfriendly legislation against Negroes dis-
tinctively as colored, ... implying inferiority in society, lessening the security of their
enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy and [imposing] discrimination which are steps
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race" (cited in Hasnas, supra note 76, at
452-53)).
103. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701-708, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (2000).
104. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). This section represents Title VII as amended
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and was not the form of the statute at issue in Griggs.
106. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 475.
107. Id.
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Before the Court's decision in Griggs, lower courts held that a violation of
Title VII required proof of a discriminatory intent or purpose and paid
little attention to the effect of the challenged practice on minorities as a
group."8 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on that issue,
and held that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability."' °9
The Griggs Court went on to say that "[u]nder the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of in-
tent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices.""' With that pronouncement,
the Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act as an anti-subordination prin-
ciple, and established what has become known as the disparate impact
theory of discrimination.11
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Court was asked to decide
what a plaintiff had to establish in order to prove that she had been sub-
ject to an adverse employment decision, based solely on her membership
in one of the Act's protected classes." 2 Justice Powell, in his opinion for
the Court, established a three-step process for proving the existence of a
discriminatory motive. The first step in the process is for the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case, which can be done by showing: 1) the plaintiff
is a member of a protected class; 2) he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3) despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and 4) after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the
plaintiff's qualifications."
3
Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the second step of
the Powell approach requires "the employer to articulate some legitimate,
108. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970) (hold-
ing that in the absence of a discriminatory purpose, requirement of high school education
or passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment in or
transfer to jobs was permitted by the Civil Rights Act).
109. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 430.
111. See Hasnas, supra note 76, at 476. Recall that the anti-subordination theory of
discrimination would prohibit "any conduct that has the effect of subordinating or con-
tinuing the subordination of a minority group." Id. at 436.
112. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the complainant applied for a job for
which he was quahfied but was not hired, allegedly because of his race. The company
claimed that the complainant was not hired because he engaged in illegal protests against
the company. Id. at 794-96. The Act lists race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, as
the five forbidden criteria upon which employment decisions cannot be based. 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
113. Id. at 802.
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nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."" 4 If the employer
articulates an acceptable reason, the plaintiff may still prevail by showing
that the employer's stated reason for rejecting the plaintiff was pretext. '
This type analysis has been used in a number of settings to prove
discriminatory conduct, including in Title VIII 6 housing discrimination
cases... and ADEA".8 age discrimination cases"9 in federal courts, and by a
state court in a sexual orientation housing discrimination claim.120 In each
of these cases, courts have recognized that the absence of a discriminatory
motive does not ensure the absence of a discriminatory result. Again, as
Chief Justice Burger stated in Griggs, "[a]bsence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that op-
erate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability."' 2' By reflecting a belief that a person cannot be
denied a job because of a characteristic unrelated to her ability to perform
the required tasks, this opinion reflects Justice Burger's adoption of the
anti-subordination principle of discrimination.
Shortly after making this landmark statement in Griggs, the Court
began its retreat from this decision and adopted a more conservative
approach. Recently, the District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina acknowledged that the Supreme Court has overruled Griggs "sub
silento.'' 122 Although the North Carolina court's interpretation of the
Supreme Court's post-Griggs equal protection jurisprudence might
overstate the issue, it does appear that the Court has begun to reject the
notion that merely a disparate impact, without proof of intentional
discrimination, is sufficient to prove statutorily or constitutionally
unacceptable discrimination. For example, if a plaintiff is alleging a
violation of Title VII as a result of hiring or promotion decisions that are
114. Id.
115. Id. at 804.
116. Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 801-820, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619.
117. See Huntington v. Huntington Branch NAACP, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1998) (holding
that disparate impact of town's refusal to amend ordinance was shown and that ordinance
would encourage developers to invest in deteriorating and needy section of town was
inadequate justification to rebut prima facie case).
118. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 % 2-17, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634.
119. See Loeb v.Textron, Inc., 600 E2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (determining that statu-
tory similarities between Title VII and ADEA justify reliance on Title VII rulings in age
discrimination cases). But see Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F2d 307, 313 n.4 (6th Cir.
1975) (stating that disparate impact may occur absent any discriminatory intent, because
older workers constantly move out of the labor market while younger ones move in).
120. See Levin v.Yeshiva Univ., 730 N.YS.2d 15 (2001).
121. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
122. United States v. North Carolina, 914 E Supp. 1257, 1265 (E.D.N.C. 1996).The
district court in this case stated that the analysis in Griggs is inconsistent with other provi-
sions of Title VII, including § 2000e-2(h), which protects the use of "ability tests" not
intended to discriminate unlawfully, Id.
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at least partially based on subjective criteria, the Court has required proof
of intentional discrimination. '23
Additionally, in Washington v. Davis, the Court declined to extend
the disparate impact analysis created under the Civil Rights Act in Griggs
to the constitutional context."4 In order to grant relief to the plaintiffs in
that case, the Court would have had to determine that unintentional gov-
ernment actions that have the effect of perpetuating the subordination of
minorities violated the Equal Protection Clause.2" It declined the exten-
sion of disparate impact analysis in this context by stating, "[w]e have
never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of in-
vidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under
Title VII, and we decline to do so today."126 This reluctance to interpret
the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause in the same manner
might have been motivated more by a fear of the consequences of apply-
ing an anti-subordination theory of discrimination in the equal protection
context.Y7 According to the Court, the disparate impact theory "involves a
more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly rea-
sonable acts of administrators and executives that is appropriate under the
Constitution."' 28 In order to avoid declaring "a whole range of tax, wel-
fare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes" unconstitutional
solely because they have a "racially disproportionate impact," the Court
declined to embrace "the proposition that a law or other official act,
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose."'
29
Along with its reluctance to continue to find equal protection viola-
tions based on disparate impact alone, the Court has been reluctant to
uphold legislation that mandates race conscious remedies for past racial
discrimination. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 3° the Supreme
Court invalidated a city plan intended to address widespread racial dis-
crimination in the local and state construction industry. The plan required
prime contractors that were awarded construction contracts to subcon-
tract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount to one or more
"Minority Business Enterprises" The Court concluded that the plan was
123. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (discretionary deci-
sion not to rehire individual who engaged in criminal acts against the employer while laid
off); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (hiring decisions based on
personal knowledge of candidates and recommendations); Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (discretionary decision to fire someone said not to get along
with co-workers).
124. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 482.
128. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247.
129. Id. at 239 (emphasis omitted).
130. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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not justified by any compelling state interest, despite the City's determina-
tion that the construction industry's past racially discriminatory hiring
practices were directly responsible for minorities representing only 0.67%
of the construction contracts issued over a five year period in a city that
was fifty percent Black.
31
These cases represent a shift away from equal protection decisions
based on the anti-subordination theory of discrimination, and a shift to-
ward decisions based on the anti-differentiation theory of discrimination.
In other words, courts have become much less willing to find objection-
able discriminatory conduct on the basis of proof of a discriminatory
impact without a coexistent discriminatory purpose. The consequences of
these shifts will be discussed in the next section.
C. "hat is the Purpose of Equal Protection?
The current Court seems to embrace Justice Harlan's theory of
colorblind constitutionalism.'32 The colorblind approach to constitutional
interpretation assumes that "equal protection of the law" is based on a
"common citizenship" that is unconnected to race.'33 The dissenters in
Rome v. United States34 provide a clear example of the current Court's
colorblind approach. In that case, the Court upheld amendments to the
Voting Rights Act of 196511 that shifted to local jurisdictions the burden
of proving that a proposed change in voting arrangements would not
adversely affect Black voters. 13 6 The dissenters, Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, objected to the amendments' premise that "[W]hite candidates
will not represent [B]lack interests, and that States should devise a system
encouraging [B]lacks to vote in a black."'37 According to critical race
theorist Neil Gotanda, the end the Court seeks by adopting this method
of constitutionalism is a "racially assimilated society in which race is
irrelevant."' 38 If this assertion is true, the Court seems to be moving
toward adopting the anti-differentiation definition of discrimination. The
131. Id. at 479-80.
132. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 539 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the debatable meaning of Harlan's theory, compare Gotanda, supra note 88, at
39, with LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTIrTIoNAL LAW § 16-22, at 1525 n.17 (2d
ed. 1988).
133. Gotanda, supra note 88, at 38.
134. 446 U.S. 263 (1977).
135. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West Supp. 1988).
136. Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 166 (Rehnquist,J., and Stewart,J, dissent-
ing).
137. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the effect of "colorblind constitutionalism,"
see Gotanda, supra note 88.
138. Gotanda, supra note 88, at 53.
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adoption of this principle has several consequences for any future equal
protection cases that come before the Court.
According to Hasnas, the anti-differentiation principle requires strict
adherence to equality of opportunity and prohibits affirmative action. '39
As discussed above,14 under this theory any classification based on race, or
some other irrelevant characteristic, is morally objectionable discrimina-
tion prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Any differential treatment
of individuals or classes of individuals, therefore, must be justified by dif-
ferences in the individual's or class's ability to serve the ends sought."' As
an example, if a private employer wants to give preferential treatment to a
certain class of people, in order to avoid violating equal protection man-
dates, the employer must show that members of the preferred class are
better able to perform the tasks required by the job.142 On this basis, one
could justify, for example, giving preferential treatment to individuals with
teaching degrees for a daycare worker's job. Hasnas asserts: "the require-
ment that differential treatment be based on distinctions in merit means
that all people must be accorded an equal opportunity to attain the relevant
benefits.1 43 The anti-differentiation principle requires not only that all
individuals are given equal opportunity to obtain employment, but also
that they are judged by the same set of merit-based selection criteria, re-
gardless of their backgrounds.
Strict adherence to this principle requires courts to hold that af-
firmative action programs violate the Equal Protection Clause. 144
Affirmative action programs award benefits to individuals and groups
based in part on race, not exclusively on merit, thereby denying White
applicants an equal opportunity to gain admissions to an educational insti-
tution.This violates the basic tenet of the anti-differentiation theory.
An important question remains to be answered, however, before we
determine that affirmative action programs are history now that the
Court has adopted an anti-differentiation theory: has the Court chosen
the correct theory of discrimination on which to base its equal protection
jurisprudence?
139. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 432.
140. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (defining the anti-differentiation
theory of discrimination).
141. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 433.
142. Id.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003), the Court upheld the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School's race-based admissions policy, noting that "the Law
School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions" did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, since it was designed to "further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body."This opinion suggests that there are inter-
ests for which the Court would be willing to abandon strict adherence to an anti-
differentiation principle.Yet, that willingness may have a time limitation;Justice O'Connor
suggests that "race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time." Id. at 341.
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This question can be answered by looking at the Framers' original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 As was discussed, Black
Codes prompted the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 In re-
sponse to the Black Codes, the Republican Congress attempted to
incorporate into the law of the land the principles for which the north
had fought the Civil War 1 7 including the end of slavery and state-
sanctioned oppression of Blacks. Therefore, a natural reading of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and its Equal Protection Clause, might be that there
is a constitutional anti-oppression mandate that was designed to keep state
governments from persecuting Blacks. It is not likely that the Framers
intended the Fourteenth Amendment to embody an anti-differentiation
principle (which prohibits classifications based on anything but merit)
because northern states continued to propagate laws that violated this
standard. ' 8
Another reason to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment is
intended to be interpreted based on an anti-oppression principle is that the
precipitating event for passage of the Amendment was President Andrew
Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.141 This Act was Congress's
first attempt to outlaw the Black Codes.5 0 Congress responded not only by
overriding Johnson's veto, but also by passing the Fourteenth Amendment
to remove any doubt that it had the authority to enact legislation like the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.111 The impetus behind passing the Fourteenth
Amendment, therefore, can be seen as a desire on the part of Congress to
empower the legislators to act against state-sponsored oppression of Blacks.
145. A great deal of literature exists regarding the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
(1992);WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAl. DOCTRINE (1988); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segre-
gation Decision, 69 HtAuv. L. REV. 1 (1955). There is also a great deal of debate about
whether interpreting the Constitution in terms of original understanding is appropriate.
For an introduction to the debate, see Rebecca E. Brown, History for the Non-Originalist, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 (2003). See also John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the
Study of History, 26 H~aov. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83 (2003); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing
Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32 (2004); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Con-
ventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpretation and Institutions, 101
MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003); Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal
Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761 (2004).
146. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a reaction to the Black Codes).
147. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 442.
148. Schools in the North continued to be segregated, for example.
149. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 443.
150. Id. at 444.
151. Id.
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The motivation was not to "require states to engage in exclusively color-
blind decision making."'
15 2
Kull notes, "Congress did what it could to ensure that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 would be what the Republican leadership had repre-
sented: a measure directed primarily at the Black Codes." ' 3 When drafting
the Fourteenth Amendment, "Congress ... considered and rejected a se-
ries of proposals that would have made the Constitution explicitly color-
blind." ' 4 Kull goes on to assert, "the evidence shows that an open-ended
promise of equality was added to the Constitution because to its moder-
ate proponents it meant less, not more, than the rule of nondiscrimination
that was the rejected radical alternative."
'
1
Further, there is support for the conclusion that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was designed with an anti-oppression theory rather than an
anti-differentiation or anti-subordination theory in mind. First, the fact
that the Congress that passed the Amendment also passed race conscious
legislation is evidence that it did not interpret the Clause to reflect an
anti-differentiation principle. During the reconstruction of the country
after the Civil War, Congress enacted a series of social welfare programs
whose benefits were limited to Blacks. 6 This suggests that this Congress
was unafraid to pass statutes that benefited the minority group, even per-
haps at the expense of the majority.
Second, the fact that Congress designed the Amendment as a
restriction on state legislative power, not as a mandate to advance the
social, economic, or political prospects of the newly-freed slaves, is proof
that it did not interpret the Clause to reflect an anti-subordination
principle. Sunstein notes:
There was no general understanding that [the Amendment]
imposed on a government a general duty to remove caste
status or banned nondiscriminatory laws that contributed to
caste status-even if it was understood that Congress would
have the power to counteract the legacy of slavery with af-
firmative legislation."7
In other words, the historical evidence does not suggest that the
Framers of the Equal Protection Clause attempted to undo the systemic
effect of slavery by prohibiting laws that were passed in order to maintain
152. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MIc H. L. REv. 2410, 2435 (1994)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Anticaste].
153. KULL, supra note 145, at 79.
154. Id. at 69.
155. Id.
156. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
157. Sunstein, Anticaste, supra note 152, at 2436.
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the status quo. This suggests they were not utilizing an anti-subordination
theory.
Finally, the early judicial understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment indicates the Court viewed the Equal Protection Clause as an anti-
oppression principle.""8 The Supreme Court first had occasion to interpret
the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases.1"9 Although the
case did not raise an issue of racial discrimination, the Court began its
analysis of the case by characterizing the Fourteenth Amendment as di-
rected against oppressive action by state governments."6 In addition, as
noted above, the Court adhered to this view in Plessy, its next landmark
Equal Protection Clause case.
As detailed above, the Supreme Court's equal protection jurispru-
dence appears to have evolved from embracing this anti-oppression
principle to embracing the anti-differentiation principle. This evolution
may represent a shift away from the original purpose and understanding
of equal protection. The Fourteenth Amendment seems to have been
passed in an attempt to prohibit racial classifications that were meant to
oppress minorities, not to prohibit classifications that might benefit
them.161 Despite the current Court's apparent belief that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause secures only the equal opportunity to obtain a particular
benefit, it is not illegitimate to read the Clause as requiring unequal
treatment to remedy the harms caused by historical racial discrimination
when the purpose of a state or federal governmental action is to oppress a
minority group. Because the purpose of the discriminatory classification is
not to oppress that group, this reading of the Equal Protection Clause
would seem to require the Court to leave undisturbed legislation that
contains racial classifications designed to benefit a minority group.62 Un-
der these circumstances, the Court should remain deferential to the
legislature's determination that a race conscious remedy is appropriate.
This same reading would require the Court to strike down legislation that
has the purpose of oppressing a minority group, and under these circum-
stances, the Court should not be deferential to the legislature. The
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment almost certainly envisioned this
dual role for the Court.
If the Court were to embrace this dual role as the watchdog of
equal protection, it would have to vary its standard of review depending
158. Hansas, supra note 76, at 448 (asserting "courts interpreted the anti-
discrimination principle contained in the Equal Protection Clause precisely as its drafters
intended, as an anti-oppression principle").
159. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
160. Id. at 70-71.
161. Affirmative action programs would not violate the Equal Protection Clause if
analyzed under an anti-oppression theory, since the programs are not intended to oppress
any disfavored group.
162. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 434-46.
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on the purpose of a statute. If the Court finds that there is no oppressive
purpose, it should utilize its least exacting standard of review and require
only that there be a rational basis for the statute. If, however, the Court
finds an oppressive discriminatory purpose behind the statute, or if the
stated justification for a statute is mere pretext, the Court should apply
strict scrutiny. This system of review would result in the Court invalidat-
ing Jim Crow laws but upholding affirmative action programs, for
example.'63
Equal protection and free exercise opinions utilize different language
to describe similar concepts of discrimination. The Court's First Amend-
ment freedom of religion jurisprudence has followed a similar evolution
from anti-oppression to anti-differentiation. The next Part of this Note
considers the Court's role in guarding religious freedom and relates it to
the Court's role in ensuring equal protection of the laws.
III.JuDICIARY AS THE WATCHDOG OF FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
The majority of challenges to prison grooming polices are based on
the claim that the regulations violate the prisoners' First Amendment free
exercise rights."' As with equal protection, in order to assess whether
these claims are valid, it is important to determine whether the Free Ex-
ercise Clause mandates or prohibits exemptions from generally applicable
laws for groups whose ability to engage in a religious practices are in-
fringed by those laws.s' This Part explores the development of the
"exemption doctrine" and concludes that the original understanding of
the Free Exercise Clause was that it requires exemptions to be granted for
those groups whose religious practices are adversely affected by generally
applicable laws. Additionally, this Part concludes that the "exemption doc-
trine" and the anti-oppression theory of discrimination are analogues in
free exercise and equal protection jurisprudence in that both theories re-
quire courts to strike down legislation that has the purpose or effect of
oppressing members of a group because they belong to a racial or reli-
gious minority. This analogy ultimately permits courts to analyze free
exercise and equal protection challenges to prison grooming policies in
the same way.
163. Id. Hasnas argues that utilizing the anti-oppression theory of discrimination, the
Equal Protection Clause would require "governmental actions and private employment
and education decisions to be made independently of racial, ethnic, or sexual animus, but
not necessarily independently of all racial, ethnic, or sexual considerations." Id. at 435. Jim
Crow laws are ripe with racial animus, and would therefore violate the clause. The oppo-
site is true of affirmative action programs.
164. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (explaining the "exemptions" and
"no-exemptions" view of the Free Exercise Clause).
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A. Exemption from Generally Applicable Laws Based
on Free Exercise of Religion
In many free exercise claims, courts have been forced to determine
whether a person or group of people should be exempt from the applica-
tion of a generally applicable law when the law infringes on the ability to
engage in a particular religious practice.166 According to McConnell, a
court's determination of this issue will hinge on which interpretation of
the governmental threat to religious liberty the Court adopts. 167 Under a
"no-exemptions" view, the Free Exercise Clause was intended "solely to
prevent the government from singling out religious practice for peculiar
disability."168 Under this view, a law is in violation of the Free Exercise
Clause only if it directly and intentionally penalizes religious obser-
vance. 69 The second and competing view is the "exemptions" view, under
which the Free Exercise Clause "protects religious practices against even
the incidental or unintended effects of government action.
1 70
The "no-exemptions" view corresponds to the anti-oppression prin-
ciple, which prohibits distinctions that are motivated by the desire to
oppress or to impose disadvantages on a minority group. 7' In contrast, the
"exemptions" view corresponds to the anti-subordination principle,
which prohibits any conduct, either intentional or unintentional, that un-
dermines the political or social status of minorities.
7
1
The Rehnquist Court has seemingly adopted a third view of the
Free Exercise Clause. According to ChiefJustice Rehnquist, when "a State
has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to ad-
vance the State's secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not ...
require the State to conform that statute to the dictates of religious con-
science of any group.'17 3 This statement seems to advocate the "no-
exemptions" view of the clause, but not on anti-oppression grounds.'74
166. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that Oregon need
not exempt two members of the Native American Church from a law proscribing the
possession of peyote); Sherbert v.Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a Seventh-Day
Adventist need not agree to work on Saturday in order to be eligible for unemployment
benefits).
167. Michael W McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of




171. Hasnas, supra note 76, at 434.
172. Id. at 437.
173. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 723 (1981) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
174. For example, the Court is not implying that the exemption in this case cannot
be granted because the statute at issue was intended to oppress a particular religious per-
spective. This implication would be necessary to support the view that the "no-
exemptions" view corresponds to the "anti-oppression" view. See supra notes 170, 173 and
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Rather, as discussed in the next section, the view that any law should not
include classifications, or exemptions, based on religious belief is strikingly
similar to the anti-differentiation principle of discrimination discussed in
the equal protection context.
In a fashion similar to its equal protection jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court's view of the Free Exercise Clause has reflected each of
these three viewpoints at different times in its history. The evolution of
the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is described in the
next section.
B. Evolution of the Free Exercise Doctrine
The Court's early free exercise cases dealt with whether freedom to
act in accordance with one's religious beliefs was protected by the First
Amendment. In Reynolds v. United States,'75 one of the early cases inter-
preting the Free Exercise Clause, the Court determined that a Mormon
man was free to believe that it was his religious duty to marry more than
one woman, but he was not free to act on that belief.' 6 In Reynolds, the
Court found that the defendant could be prosecuted under a federal law
that made polygamy a crime despite his sincerely held religious belief in
the practice.'77 The Court determined that the Free Exercise Clause only
protected religious belief, not action taken in furtherance of that belief
when the action violates generally applicable laws.'78 Therefore, the First
Amendment protected Reynolds' belief that polygamy was required, but
it did not protect the actual practice of polygamy.
More than sixty years after Reynolds, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,'79 the
Court determined that although the freedom to believe was absolute, "ac-
tion could be regulated 'for the protection of society' as long as
government did not 'unduly infringe the protected freedom.' "180 The
accompanying text (defining the "no-exemptions" view of the Free Exercise Clause). See
Hasnas supra note 76 (describing anti-oppression principle of discrimination).
175. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 166.
179. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
180. Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 7, 28 (1993) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940)) [hereinafter Pepper, Conflicting]. Cantwell was one in a series of cases dealing with
the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses. See, e.g., Follet v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573
(1944); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938). In these cases, the Court was not required to distinguish the parameters
of freedom of religion from freedom of speech, because much of the conduct of the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses was "almost exclusively communicative-classic speech, press and assembly
activity such as street corner proselytization through direct conversation, the playing of
records, and the distribution of handbills." Pepper, Conflicting, supra, at 28-29. Under the
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Court veered significantly from this position when it decided Sherbert v.
Verner"' and Wisconsin v. Yoder.'82 In Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist
woman lost her job and was denied unemployment compensation bene-
fits because of her refusal to work on Saturday, her Sabbath."3 In Yoder,
Amish parents were convicted for violating the mandatory school-
attendance law when they refused, on the basis of their religious belief, to
send their children to school for ninth and tenth grades, the final two
years of compulsory education.'84 Through these cases, the Court an-
nounced a test with language suggesting religious conduct would be
afforded sweeping protections by either striking down or mandating ex-
ceptions to laws that had significant adverse effects on the ability of
people to engage in religious conduct. 85
Stephen Pepper indicates that the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine ' consists
of five main components. First, "action [is] protected-conduct beyond
speech, press, or worship [is] included in the shelter of freedom of relig-
ion '1 87 Second, "indirect impositions on religious conduct, ... as well as
direct restraints, . . . [are] prohibited." '88 In other words, the pure Sherbert-
Yoder doctrine requires courts to aggressively protect the conduct involved
in religious observances from even incidental impositions caused by state
or federal legislation. Accordingly, the Sherbert Court indicated that even
an "incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be
justified [only] by a 'compelling state interest.'"89 With this pronounce-
ment, the Court seemed to adopt an "exemption" view that is completely
in line with the anti-subordination view of discrimination.
Third, "the protection granted [to free exercise must be] exten-
sive."' Under this component of the test, the government must show an
extremely strong countervailing state interest in order to justify an im-
pingement on religious conduct. 9 ' Fourth, the Free Exercise Clause is
"backed by a requirement that the government provide proof of the im-
portant interest at stake and of the danger to that interest presented by the
holdings of this series of cases, it was unclear whether the Free Exercise Clause had any
effect independent of the freedom of speech. Id.
181. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
182. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
183. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
184. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
185. Pepper, Conflicting, supra note 180, at 29.
186. See Pepper, Conflicting, supra note 180, at 11; Stephen Pepper, Taking The Free
Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 299 (1986) [hereinafter Pepper, Taking].
187. Pepper, Conflicting, supra note 180, at 30.
188. Id.
189. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
190. Pepper, Conflicting, supra note 180, at 30.
191. Id. at 30-31.
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religious conduct at issue." '92 According to Pepper, to determine the dam-
age to the government interest, the court should focus on the "effect that
exempting religious claimants from the regulation would have, rather than
on the value of the regulation in general." '193 In other words, the govern-
ment has to show how its "interests would be harmed by excepting
religious conduct from the law being challenged."'94 Finally, even if the
government meets this burden, it must show that there is no "less drastic
means to reach the interest that less severely affects the religious practice
at issue. ""'
This test is very similar to the test for employment discrimination
claims announced by the Court in McDonnell.196 Notice that neither the
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine nor the test in McDonnell require the plaintiff to
establish a discriminatory motive making these tests consistent with the
anti-subordination principle of discrimination.
Ten years later, in United States v. Lee,197 the Court issued an opinion
that indicated an erosion of the Sherbert- Yoder doctrine. In Lee, the Court
decided that an Amish employer who employed only Amish employees
should be required to comply with the Social Security Act, including
payment of taxes for his employees, even though a statutory exemption
from social security tax was provided for self-employed Amish because of
their religious beliefs.The government is required to show that the system
would be harmed under the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine. Absent this showing,
courts faithfully applying the doctrine probably would rule in favor of the
religious claimant. However, nothing in the Lee opinion indicates that
"exempting Amish employers who employ only Amish would be so dif-
ferent from the already existing exemption for the self-employed as to
significantly harm the system as a whole."'0 5
Eight years after Lee, the Court decided a case in which it seemed to
reject a constitutionally-required free exercise exemption. In Employment
Division v. Smith,'99 the Court determined that Oregon was not compelled
by the Free Exercise Clause to exempt Native Americans from the state's
peyote proscription.2" In that case, two members of the Native American
Church were fired and denied unemployment compensation after it was
discovered that they had ingested peyote during a religious ceremony.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion gave two important indications about the
192. Id. at 31.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Pepper, Taking, supra note 186, at 309.
196. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (defining the McDonnell Douglas
test for discrimination in the employment context).
197. 455 U.S. 252 (1972).
198. Pepper, Taking, supra note 186, at 324.
199. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
200. Id. at 874.
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direction of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence. First, the Court is
content to leave the decision about whether or not to grant religious ex-
emption from state law to the state legislatures. 20 ' Scalia suggested that it
was appropriate to "[leave religious] accommodation to the political proc-
ess.' 202 Second, the Court expressed distinct hostility toward religious
exemptions.2 3 Justice Scalia further asserted that courts should not typi-
cally exempt religious believers from a "neutral law of general
applicability.
24
This is not to suggest that the Court will uphold facially neutral
laws that are motivated by a desire to discriminate against particular relig-
ions. After Smith, the Court struck down a series of local ordinances that
proscribed the ritual slaughter of animals.2 0 In that case, the legislative
history and other evidence demonstrated that the purpose of the ordi-
nances was to "target animal sacrifice Santeria [religion] worshippers
because of its religious motivation. 2 6 This decision indicates that the
Court has not entirely abandoned the notion that the Free Exercise
Clause protects religious groups from intentional discrimination, and, in
turn, it has not completely abandoned the anti-oppression view of dis-
crimination.
The hostility toward religious exemptions is analogous to the hostil-
ity toward classifications based on race or religious belief, the foundation
of the anti-differentiation principle of discrimination in the equal protec-
tion context. So, although the Court is seemingly moving towards an
anti-differentiation view of the Free Exercise Clause, at least with respect
to how courts should interpret the clause, the question remains whether
the Court has adopted the correct view. The next section of this Note
will attempt to find a plausible answer to that question by exploring the
historical foundations and original purposes of the Free Exercise Clause.
C. "hat is the Purpose of Free Exercise?
According to Stephen Pepper, the Free Exercise Clause was "aimed
at prohibiting support for one or several favored sects through negative
provisions aimed at other disfavored sects such as limitation of the fran-
chise, imprisonment, or banishment." '2 7 The aim of this provision can be
characterized as both disestablishment and as separation of church and
201. David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A Criti-
calAssessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241,250 (1995).
202. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 890.
203. Steinberg, supra note 201, at 250.
204. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment)).
205. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
206. Id. at 542.
207. Pepper, Conflicting, supra note 180, at 15 (emphasis omitted).
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state. 28 Acquiring a deeper understanding of how this provision affects
contemporary issues is difficult because, according to legal historians, the
original supporters of this provision did so for at least three different rea-
sons.
20 9
The first significant support for the Free Exercise Clause came from
those men, exemplified by Jefferson and Madison, who adhered to an
Enlightenment-deist-rationalist view.2" ' Under this view, the separation
between church and state was designed primarily to protect the "new
experimental federal government" from the "likely disruptive and possibly
destructive influence of organized religion." '2 ' The second significant sup-
port for the Free Exercise Clause came from those men who adhered to a
radical Protestant view.212 Under this view, the separation of church and
state was designed primarily to protect "the church from the profane and
corrupt influence of the state. '213 The third and most predominant group
of men supported the Free Exercise Clause as a federalism provision."4
This group viewed the federal government as a threat to religions that
had already been established within the states but felt comfortable leaving
the states free in the realm of church and state." ' This view has largely
become an anachronism since the Supreme Court has incorporated the
First Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied it against the states.21 6 As a result, the "still rele-
vant historical purposes and meanings are primarily those of the
Enlightenment-deist-rationalist view and the radical Protestant view.
'" 217
Supporters of each of these viewpoints believed that some space
between the government and the church was important, albeit for very
different reasons. Under the radical Protestant view, the absolute
protection of religion was necessary to ensure that "government is left
free to be what the government wants to be, but space must be left for the
church to be what it must be." '2 8 Even those men who espoused the
seemingly irreconcilable Enlightenment view felt that the church must be
"wholly exempt" from the rule of government.2 ' James Madison, one of
208. Id.
209. Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond:Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause,
1981 Utah L. Rev. 309,311-17 (1982).
210. Pepper, Conflicting, supra note 180, at 15-16.




215. See MARK D. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 19-23 (1965); WILBER
G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 8-10 (1964).
216. Pepper, Conflicting, supra note 180, at 17.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 22.
219. Id. at 23.
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the preeminent proponents of the Enlightenment view, explained that
religion was "the duty which we owe to our Creator. "220 He went on to
state that:
This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can
be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be con-
sidered as a subject of the Governour of the Universe: And if a
member of Civil Society who enters into any subordinate As-
sociation, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to
the General Authority; much more must every man who be-
comes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a
saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.
21
Both the Enlightenment and the radical Protestant views, therefore,
consider religion something that should be free from interference by the
government. 2 2 The placement of religion beside speech and the press in
the Bill of Rights indicates that the drafters of the First Amendment likely
meant for religion to be protected to the same extent as those two free-
doms.
223
Additionally, the placement of the Free Exercise Clause alongside
the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses may indicate that the three rights
were to be protected from the types of historical suppression to which
they had been subjected. For example, the freedom of expression provi-
sion "undoubtedly was a reaction against the suppression of speech and of
the press that existed in English society."224 Until late in the seventeenth
century, no publication was allowed without a government granted li-
cense. 25 Additionally, the English law of seditious libel, which made it a
crime to criticize the government, restricted speech.2 6 According to
Zechariah Chaffee, the First Amendment was "intended to wipe out the
common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism of
the government, without any incitement to law-breaking, forever
220. James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, in James Madison on Religious
Liberty 55, 56 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVI
(1776)).
221. Id.
222. See Pepper, Conflicting, supra note 180, at 23 (stating that people espousing both
views felt the separation of government and religion was essential: radical protestants be-
cause government and religious institutions needed room to be what they needed to be
and Enlightenment protestants because one's political duties must be kept subordinate to
one's religious duties).
223. Id.
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impossible in the United States of America."227 The inference can be made
that the freedom of expression provisions were designed to prevent the
intentional suppression of unpopular thoughts or beliefs. 228 With its inclu-
sion in the First Amendment, it may be assumed that the Framers
envisioned the Free Exercise Clause to prevent the intentional suppression
of religious practices.
2 29
That this clause is meant to prevent intentional suppression of relig-
ion corresponds with the anti-oppression theory of discrimination in the
equal protection context. This correspondence permits courts to analyze
challenges to prison grooming policies based on either the Free Exercise
or Equal Protection Clauses in the same manner: upholding those poli-
cies, which are motivated by the desire to suppress bona fide religious
belief, and striking down those policies that, although they have the effect
of suppressing these beliefs, are not enacted with that improper motive.
IV. ANALYZING PRISON GROOMING POLICIES UNDER
AN ANTI-OPPRESSION THEORY
It is the contention of this Note that the original understandings of
the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses indicate that their Fram-
ers intended to protect unpopular minority groups and religions from
intentional discrimination..2 13 As a result, cases brought under the Equal
Protection Clause or the Freedom of Exercise Clause should be analyzed
under an anti-oppression principle of discrimination, because this theory
best captures the original understanding of those clauses. An analysis of
this type would be similar to the burden-shifting approach that is utilized
in disparate impact claims.
In Washington v. Davis, 23 the Court noted that "a law, neutral on its
face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pur-
sue, is [not] invalid under [equal protection] simply because it may affect a
greater proportion of one race than of another' '232 A plaintiff bringing an
equal protection claim, therefore, has the burden of proving that a law or
regulation was enacted with a discriminatory purpose. The Court admit-
ted that this burden is a difficult one for the plaintiff to meet,233 but it has
227. ZECHAIAH CHAFFEE,JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1941).
228. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 224, at 748-49.
229. For a discussion of whether this assumption is correct, see, Pepper, Conflicting,
supra note 180, at 22-26 (analyzing the Free Exercise Clause in light of the structure of
and theories underlying the First Amendment).
230. See supra Parts I.C, III.C and accompanying text and notes.
231. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
232. Id. at 242.
233. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256 (1977) ("Some-
times a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of
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stood by its decision that in equal protection jurisprudence, disparate im-
pact, standing alone, "does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are
to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the
weightiest of considerations."
234
With a burden that the Court has admitted is particularly difficult to
satisfy, how is a plaintiff to successfully challenge a law or regulation under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? In his concurring
opinion in Davis, Justice Stevens noted that "[f]requently the most proba-
tive evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually
happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of
the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural
consequences of his deeds" 231 With this in mind, should the Court be
more suspicious of policies that burden freedoms guaranteed in the Con-
stitution?
Under the anti-oppression theory, unequal treatment is permitted if
the motivation behind the treatment does not indicate an intent to op-
press. Under this type of analysis, the plaintiff would have to establish that
the regulation oppresses a protected activity. In the case of prison groom-
ing codes, the regulation prohibits male members of particular religious
groups from practicing a fundamental tenet of their religion. Freedom of
religious practice, although not entirely unrestricted, is protected under
the First Amendment. Having met its burden, the state is then required to
establish that its regulation was not enacted with the purpose of oppress-
ing that activity. Pretext indicates that there may have been some
prohibited motivation, so the reasonable test proffered by the court in
Turner should demand at least minimal substantiation by prison officials
that alternatives to their policies are infeasible.236 This arm of the analysis is
virtually identical to the showing advocated by the Second Circuit in Ab-
dul Wali v. Coughlin.
237
Whether the reasons offered for these policies are reasonably related
to the goal of institutional safety is an open question." 8 As observed above,
the fact that states have offered so many justifications for similar policies
may indicate that the purpose of the policy is not to maintain institutional
safety, but rather, for example, to impose conformity on the prisons'
the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.... But
such cases are rare.").
234. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
235. Id. at 253 (Stevens,J., concurring).
236. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Recall that the Court stated that a prison
regulation, which infringes on a protected right, is valid if it is reasonably related to a valid
penological interest, but warning that the "existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be
evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response' to prison
concerns." Id. at 89-90.
237. 754 E2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985).
238. See supra Section I.C text and accompanying notes (questioning whether the
justifications for prison grooming policies are convincing or merely pretext).
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inmates. The ease with which less-restrictive alternatives2 39 are found may
be an indication that the justifications for these policies are merely
pretext. Additionally, the fact that federal prisons have generally
considered grooming policies unnecessary to ensure safety in their
facilities weighs against the legitimacy that less-restrictive alternatives are
infeasible for state prisons. Each of the five common reasons for prison
grooming policies will be addressed separately, in order to show that less
restrictive, yet equally effective, alternatives are available.
Reason 1: Beards prevent prison officials from quickly and easily identifying
prisoners because they can be altered quickly to hide or change facial characteristics.
As an alternative to prohibiting beards entirely, one plaintiff suggested that
prison officials take two photographs of each prisoner, one with facial hair
and one without, to assist prison officials in identification.2 4 Additionally,
this justification has little weight when applied to plaintiffs with bona fide
religious beliefs who grow beards for purely religious purposes. These
men are generally not permitted by their religion to shave any portion of
their beards, and so alterations of the sort that would radically alter their
appearances are not likely to be common.
Reason 2: Beards, long hair, and dreadlocks give prisoners additional areas in
which to hide contraband; increased searches require prison personnel to have in-
creased physical contact with inmates. However, as the Sixth Circuit reasoned
in Flagner, permitting beards would not necessarily require prison em-
ployees to have any, or much more, additional contact with inmates in
order to search for contraband.24 Prisons can simply require that the in-
mate run his hands through a beard or sidelocks, unfasten ponytails, or
shake out dreadlocks. The inconveniences caused by these methods of
ensuring that prisoners are not hiding contraband are minor when com-
pared to the harm that may be caused by requiring an inmate to violate a
tenet of his faith. 42 Additionally, these measures do not present appreciable
alterations to current security procedures.
239. See, e.g., Flagner v.Wilkinson, 241 E3d 475, 485 (6th Cir. 2001) (requiring in-
mate to run his hands through hair and beard during contraband searches); Green v.
Polunsky, 229 E3d. 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2000), (raising both alternatives, although both re-
jected by court); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 E Supp. 2d 48, 67 (D.D.C. 2000)
(raising same alternative, although here rejected be court); Friedman v. Arizona, 912 E2d
328, 332 (9th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff raising and court rejecting the same alternative); Fromer
v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1989) (rephotographing inmates who grow beards). The
author also offers her own suggestion of requiring hair nets in areas where prisoner hy-
giene and safety are concerns.
240. Fromer, 874 E2d. at 71 (stating "prison officials had available to them 'the less
restrictive means of rephotographing the inmate whenever the growth of his beard signifi-
cantly changes his appearance"' (quoting Fromer v. Scully, 649 F Supp. 512, 521 (S.D.N.Y
1986)).
241. Flagner, 241 F3d at 485.
242. Although the Court has never required prisons to "balance" the interests of
prison security against the interests of prisoner faith when making decisions about appro-
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Reason 3: Beards and long hair present hygienic concerns for those inmates
working in food preparation and safety concerns for those working with machinery.
Inmates, like any people employed in food service, may be required to
wear nets that cover any facial hair to prevent shedding into food. The
same is true for inmates who work with machinery. However, as an alter-
native, these inmates could be assigned to work that does not present
these types of hazards.
Additionally, prisons generally do not require female inmates who
work with machines or in food service areas to cut their hair, implying
that allowing long hair for religious reasons is not an unfeasible accom-
modation. The presence of an alternative means of dealing with the safety
and hygiene problems in women's prisons is an indication that less-
restrictive alternatives are available and are feasible in men's prisons as
well.
Reason 4: Permitting exemptions from the grooming policies creates resent-
ment by other prisoners who are not exempted for religious reasons. Of the
reasons offered by prison officials for not offering religious exemptions
from the grooming policies, this is perhaps the most compelling. Most
people are resentful about special dispensation given to others for a char-
acteristic they do not possess, particularly when that other person is being
exempted from a burden that those not receiving exemptions are still re-
quired to bear. However, even those institutions that have strict grooming
policies against facial hair make exceptions for those inmates with medical
conditions that prohibit them from shaving. The resentment that is fos-
tered in other inmates because of these medical exemptions is not likely
to be any different from the resentment fostered because of religious ex-
emptions. If prison officials are able to absorb the consequences in one
case, there is little reason to assume that they could not do so in the other.
Additionally, as mentioned in Part I, the federal Bureau of Prisons
has policies that require inmates to prove that their desire to participate in
some religious activities is motivated by a bona fide religious belief.
24 3
There is no indication that requiring prisoners to prove a bona fide belief
under these circumstances would be any different. The prisoner could be
required to submit a request to be exempt from the policy in writing and
then be interviewed by a prison chaplain. If the chaplain remains
priate prison policy, comparing the interests at stake might be helpful in determining how
much deference to give a particular policy. In this case, institutional security can be ac-
complished by a less-restrictive means, which may not only indicate that courts should
favor the religious interest, but also that the reason for the policy is pretextual. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (asserting that existence of obvious alternative means
may indicate that a regulation is unreasonable).
243. See, e.g., 28 C.ER. § 548.18 (1986) (requiring a prisoner to submit a written
request to the chaplain for time off from work to observe a religious holy day); 28 C.E.R.
§ 548. 29 (a) (1986) (requiring inmate to provide a written statement articulating the reli-
gious motivation for participation in the religious diet program).
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unconvinced that the prisoner's beliefs are genuine, the inmate may not
qualify for the exemption.
Reason 5: Grooming policies discourage gang activities by prohibiting prison-
ers from using hairstyles to foster group identities. However, this does not seem
to be a legitimate concern because institutions that prohibit long hair for
purposes of discouraging gang activity have no similar prohibition against
shaved heads. 44 Shaving one's head is often an indicator of gang affilia-
tion.245 If prison officials were legitimately concerned with hairstyles that
indicate gang affiliation, it is unreasonable for them to allow one of the
most universally recognizable hairstyles associated with gang affiliation.
Additionally, there is no guarantee that prisoners will not continue
to use hairstyle as a method of group identification if they are required to
cut their hair. One group may choose a flattop, for example, as a means of
indicating their group identity, while another may choose a short fade.
These alternative means of styling short hair may be just as effective a way
of signifying gang affiliation as the alternative means of styling long hair.
As a result, the requirement that hair be short may not effectively elimi-
nate or even alleviate the problem of gang activity and group affiliation.
Deference to prison officials often leads courts to accept the reasons
above as sufficiently compelling governmental interests. However, as seen
by the ease with which less-restrictive alternative measures can be found,
courts are simply not trying hard enough to examine the legitimacy of
the governments' claims. When a court is endorsing a restriction on a
fundamental civil right, even for prisoners-and perhaps especially to
prisoners who are often subject to so many deprivations by virtue of be-
ing incarceration-it should hold the government to a higher standard.
After all, prison inmates should not be exempted from the original pur-
poses of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses.
CONCLUSION
The original understandings of both the Equal Protection and Free
Exercise Clauses indicate that the Framers intended to prevent intentional
discrimination by the government that oppressed minority or undesirable
groups and religions. Under this anti-oppression theory, a statute or regu-
lation may treat groups differently as long as the motivation behind the
unequal treatment is not the oppression of the minority group. If prison
grooming policies were analyzed using this principle of discrimination, it
is not entirely clear that the Court would uphold them. The number of
244. The Ohio grooming policy is an exception. It does specifically prohibit shaved
heads. See Ohio Administrative Code § 5120-9-25(D) (2000).
245. Hines v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., 148 E3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 1998) (not-
ing that, according to prison officials, "prison gangs tried to intimidate correctional officers
and victimize other inmates, and prison officials were aware that prison gangs used hair-
style to maintain group identity").
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different justifications for similar policies, the fact that federal prisons have
found these policies unnecessary, and the ease with which less-
discriminatory means of meeting the same goal of institutional safety may
lead courts to determine that the actual motivation for these policies is
enforcing conformity among prisoners. This purpose has an oppressive
effect on the free exercise of religion, a freedom that is protected by the
Constitution.
Justice Brennan has stated: "[Prisoners] ask us to acknowledge that
power exercised in the shadows must be restrained as diligently as power
that acts in the sunlight."246 A return to the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment would guarantee that
one of the few freedoms retained by prisoners is not unduly restrained.
246. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,355 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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